SWIM is a peer-to-peer group membership protocol that uses randomized probing and gossip to obtain attractive scaling and robustness properties. Sensitivity to slow message processing, due to factors such as CPU exhaustion, network delay or loss, can lead SWIM to declare healthy members faulty. To counter this, SWIM adds a Suspicion mechanism, that trades increased failure detection latency for a lower false positive failure detection rate. However, relatively short lived periods of slow message processing commonly experienced in data centers can still lead to healthy members being marked as failed.
We observe that the Suspicion mechanism still assumes timely processing of some messages. In particular, refutation of a suspicion can only succeed if it is processed by the suspecting member in a timely manner. However, missing expected responses could indicate a member is experiencing slow message processing, and an episode of slow message processing at a given group member is likely to impact multiple of its interactions with other members in a short period of time. Based on these insights, we define a set of extensions to SWIM that allow a member to dynamically adjust its timeouts to mitigate timeliness issues. We call these extensions Lifeguard.
We analyze the effect of Lifeguard using synthetic benchmarks that vary message processing delays in a controlled manner. Across the wide range of cases tested, Lifeguard is able to reduce the false positive rate by a factor of more than 50x, while modestly increasing failure detection latency and message load. Furthermore, by modifying tuning parameters, Lifeguard allows users to reduce median detection latency by 45% while still reducing false positives at healthy members by 3x compared to without Lifeguard. The tuning parameters allow users to choose a suitable trade-off between lower false positives and lower detection latency.
Introduction
Three key issues that any distributed system must address are discovery, fault detection, and load balancing among its components. Group membership is an intuitive abstraction that can be used to address all three issues simultaneously. Members of a group and its clients are offered a dynamically updating view of the current group membership, and use this view to perform actions such as request routing and state migration.
SWIM [1] is a peer-to-peer group membership protocol that uses randomized probe-based failure detection and gossip-based update dissemination to obtain a number of attractive properties:
• Scalability. In SWIM, the expected time to first detection of a failure, the false positive rate, and the message load per group member are independent of group size. Time to fully disseminate a failure grows logarithmically with group size. • Robustness. Because the protocol is fully decentralized, the simultaneous failure or network partition of any subset of the group members can be tolerated. Even fully partitioned sub-groups can continue to operate, and automatically merge once connectivity is re-established. • Ease of deployment and maintenance. The fully decentralized nature of the protocol means a prospective member can contact any current member to join the group, and no special action has to be taken to keep the system healthy when a member leaves. • Simplicity of implementation. The SWIM protocol has few states and messages. Because it is peerto-peer, no special structure, such as leaders or hierarchies, has to be configured initially or maintained upon membership change.
The use of gossip-based update dissemination makes SWIM weakly consistent. That is, different members may have a different view of the group membership at a given point in time. In practice, weak consistency is acceptable for many applications. Where it is not acceptable, as the SWIM paper points out, strong consistency can be achieved by layering a consistent view on top of SWIM, that checkpoints the membership list. 1 A more problematic property is the sensitivity of SWIM's failure detector sub-protocol to slow processing of its messages, which can be due to factors such as CPU exhaustion, network delay or packet loss. This can result in false positive failure detections, where healthy members are incorrectly declared faulty. This is a serious concern, as there are often costs associated with diverting traffic away from a member (for example, the need to re-balance data replicas, or provision another member to handle the diverted load), and there may also be costs associated with re-integrating the member into the system once it is declared healthy again.
The SWIM paper addresses this issue by adding a Suspicion mechanism, where a member that fails a failure detector check goes to a suspected state rather than immediately being declared faulty. The suspicion is shared via SWIM's gossip-based dissemination mechanism, to see if the suspicion can be refuted before a suspicion timeout is reached and the member is declared faulty. In this way, the Suspicion mechanism trades increased failure detection latency for a lower false positive failure detection rate.
However, our experience implementing and supporting memberlist [5] , an open source implementation of SWIM, and systems that use it (Consul [3] , Nomad [6] , and Serf [7] ) shows that even with the Suspicion mechanism, false failure detections occur at a noticeable rate under conditions commonly experienced in data centers. Relatively short lived periods of slow message processing can still lead to healthy members being marked as failed. The problem is exacerbated when multiple members are slow concurrently. Even healthy members may mark other healthy members as failed, if they are influenced by their interactions with the slow members.
We observe that the Suspicion mechanism still assumes timely processing of some messages. In particular, refutation of a suspicion can only succeed if it is processed by the suspecting member in a timely manner. However, missing expected responses could indicate a member is experiencing slow message processing, and an episode of slow message processing at a given group member is likely to impact multiple of its interactions 1 This is the approach[2] taken by Consul [3] , which uses Raft [4] to present a strongly consistent view of the membership view it obtains from the underlying SWIM implementation provided by memberlist [5] . While this produces a dependency on the availability of a quorum of the Raft servers, the benefits of SWIM described above still apply to the resources under management, which still only need to act as SWIM group members. with other members in a short period of time. Based on these insights, we define a set of extensions to SWIM that allow a member to dynamically adjust its timeouts to mitigate timeliness issues. We call these extensions Lifeguard.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes SWIM and memberlist, the implementation of SWIM used for the evaluation of Lifeguard. Section 3 describes the Lifeguard extensions. Section 4 describes the experimental evaluation of the extensions, individually and in combination. Finally, Section 5 discusses the conclusions that can be drawn from the experimental results, and discusses future work.
SWIM and memberlist
In this section we first review SWIM, and then describe memberlist, the implementation of SWIM that the evaluation in this paper is based upon.
SWIM

SWIM has two components:
• a Failure Detector, that detects failures of members.
• a Dissemination Component, that disseminates updates about members that either joined or left the group, or failed.
The failure detector is taken from prior work [8] . It is fully decentralized, with each group member working asynchronously in rounds of some configurable duration, called the protocol period. In each protocol period, each member picks one other member at random to check the health of, and performs a direct probe by sending that member a ping message. If an ack message is not received within a configurable amount of time, the member initiating the check performs an indirect probe, by choosing k more members and sending each of them a ping-req message. Receiving the ping-req message causes each of the k members to send a ping message to the member under investigation. If any of them receives an ack in response, it forwards it to the original probing member. If the original member does not receive any ack messages from the direct or indirect probe by the end of the protocol period, the probed member is considered to have failed the failure detection.
The dissemination component is gossip-based. 2 Each update about a member joining or leaving the group or failing is shared with one other member λ log(n) times, where n is the size of the known group and λ is a tunable multiplier. The updates are piggybacked on the ping, ping-req and ack messages of the failure detection protocol, so that no additional messages are sent. The number of updates piggybacked on each message is limited (to respect any limit on the message size, such as the MTU of a UDP packet), and updates that have been shared less times are preferred, to try and progress the dissemination of all updates in times of high update activity.
In the simplest realization of SWIM, when a member fails a failure detection check, it is immediately marked as failed, and the failure is shared with the group via the dissemination component. However, for reasons that are discussed in Section 3, the failure detector is sensitive to slow processing of its protocol messages, which can lead to a high rate of false positive failure detections. To address this, the SWIM paper introduces the Suspicion mechanism. It is introduced as an extension, but in practice is a necessary part of SWIM.
With Suspicion enabled, a member that fails a failure detector check goes to an intermediate suspected state, and a suspect message is gossiped via the dissemination mechanism, to see if the suspicion can be refuted before a suspicion timeout is reached. Any member that receives a suspect message also marks the specified member as suspect, and gossips its suspicion. If a suspicion timeout is reached without the suspicion being refuted, the suspected member is declared faulty, by the gossiping of a confirm message. In this way, the Suspicion mechanism trades increased failure detection latency for a lower false positive failure detection rate.
A suspicion is refuted by an alive message being gossiped about the suspected member and reaching all members that harbor the suspicion before any of them reaches its suspicion timeout. The SWIM paper describes two mechanisms by which an alive message may be originated: Either by a member that harbors a suspicion, after it successfully probes the suspected member in a round of failure detection, or by the suspected member itself, after it receives a suspect or confirm message about itself. However, in practice, the suspected member must gossip an alive message about itself for refutation to work. 3 The other refinement to the basic protocol that the SWIM paper makes is to have each member select its fault detector targets in round-robin fashion from its list of known members, as opposed to completely at random. Without this, the worst-case first-detection latency would be unbounded, due to the (extremely rare) case that selection of fault detector targets across all members of the group repeatedly fails to select the faulty member. By probing in round-robin, the worst case is bounded. However, each member's list still has a random order, with new members being inserted at random positions. Consequently, the expected first detection latency is unchanged.
memberlist
memberlist [5] is an open source implementation of SWIM, used by projects including Consul [3] , Nomad [6] , and Serf [7] . memberlist implements all of the features of SWIM described above. It has the following additional features:
• memberlist's fault detector uses UDP by default for both direct and indirect probes. But in parallel to issuing indirect probes over UDP, it will attempt a direct probe over TCP. This helps with situations where TCP traffic is correctly routed, but UDP is not, which is a pathology sometimes encountered in network configuration.
• memberlist adds an anti-entropy mechanism, by which each member periodically does a full state sync with another randomly selected member, over TCP. The push-pull approach from [9] is taken, with incarnation numbers used to reconcile conflicting state about a given member. This full state sync increases the likelihood that nodes are fully converged more quickly, at the expense of more bandwidth usage. It is particularly helpful for speeding up recovery from a network partition.
• memberlist has a dedicated gossip layer separate from the failure detection protocol. Like SWIM, memberlist will piggyback gossip messages (suspect, alive and confirm 4 ) on to fault detector messages (ping, ping-req, ack), but it also will periodically send out gossip messages on their own. This allows the gossip rate to be tuned independently of the failure detection rate, and if necessary faster than it, to speed the rate of convergence.
• memberlist retains the state of failed nodes for a period of time, so that information about failed nodes can be passed in a full state sync. This helps the state of the group converge more quickly.
As these features are typically enabled in deployments of memberlist, they are all enabled for the evaluation in this paper.
Lifeguard Extensions to SWIM
As discussed in Section 2.1, the SWIM failure detector is sensitive to slow processing of its messages, which can lead to a high rate of false positive failure detections. The SWIM paper acknowledges this and introduces the Suspicion mechanism to address it.
Unfortunately, our experience implementing and supporting memberlist and systems that use it (Consul, Nomad, and Serf), shows that the Suspicion mechanism is insufficient to prevent false failure detections with many common workloads in datacenter and cloud environments. In particular, the assumption of a crash-stop failure mode does not account for short-lived slow message processing which can be caused by traffic bursts or computationally heavy batch processing. This can cause healthy members to be falsely declared as faulty, and is exacerbated when multiple members in a cluster are impacted concurrently.
The Suspicion mechanism's benefit comes from its use of the SWIM dissemination mechanism for propagation of both suspicions and their refutation. The dissemination mechanism's epidemic infection style makes it resilient to the presence of slow members, which just fail to participate in the dissemination in a timely manner. The dissemination mechanism will work around those members, and retain its exponential characteristics, up to quite a large proportion of the group being slow members.
While investigating possible solutions, we observed that the Suspicion mechanism still assumes some timely processing of messages. In particular, refutation of a suspicion can only succeed if the resulting alive message is processed by the suspecting member in a timely manner. However, missing expected responses could indicate a member is experiencing slow message processing. Also, an episode of slow message processing at a given group member is likely to impact multiple of its interactions with other members in a short period of time.
Based on these insights, we define a set of extensions to SWIM that allow a member to dynamically adjust its timeouts to mitigate timeliness issues. We call these extensions Lifeguard.
Lifeguard is comprised of three components:
• Self-Awareness replaces the fixed period and timeout of SWIM's failure detector probes with ones that are dynamically adjusted, based on that member's recent failure detection-related communication with other members.
• Dogpile replaces SWIM's fixed suspicion timeout with a dynamic one, that starts long for each new suspicion and is reduced as suspicions about the same member are received from other members.
• Buddy System optimizes notifying a suspected member of the suspicion, to reduce the average time to refutation, which helps both the existing Suspicion mechanism and the Self-Awareness extension.
These components are described in detail the sections that follow.
Self-Awareness
Self-Awareness replaces the fixed period and timeout of SWIM's failure detector probes with ones that are dynamically adjusted, based on that member's recent failure detection-related communication with other members. Several sources of feedback are used:
• The number of ack messages that have been received is compared to the number of ping and ping-req messages issued. Missing ack messages could be due to local slowness, especially if there are multiple.
• The need to refute a suspicion against itself indicates that the member may not have processed recent ping messages in a timely manner.
• Self-Awareness adds a nack message to the fault detector protocol, which is sent in the case of failed indirect probes. 5 This gives the member that initiates the indirect probe a way to check if it is receiving timely responses from the k members it enlists, even if the target of their indirect pings is not responsive.
These different sources of feedback are combined in a Node Self Awareness counter (NSA). NSA is a saturating counter, with a max value S and min value zero, meaning it will not increase above S or decrease below zero. The following events cause the specified changes to the NSA counter:
• Successful probe (ping or ping-req with ack): -1
• Failed probe +1
• Refuting a suspect message about self: +1
• Probe with missed nack: +1 5 When a member is sent a ping-req message, it will send a nack sent back at 80% of the probe timeout unless it receives an ack by that time. An ack is still forwarded if it is received after the nack has been sent, and a member receiving a nack followed by an ack within the timeout period considers this as a successful indirect probe.
The current value of NSA is used to set fault detector timeouts as follows:
ProbeInterval is the period between attempting a liveness probe against successive randomly selected peers, and ProbeTimeout is the timeout on a given probe. In the memberlist implementation, BaseProbeInterval defaults to 1 second and BaseProbeTimeout to 500 milliseconds. S defaults to 8, which means the probe interval and timeout will back off as high as 9 seconds and 4.5 seconds, respectively.
Dogpile
Dogpile replaces SWIM's fixed suspicion timeout with a dynamic one, that starts significantly higher than it would in the fixed case, but is reduced as independent suspicions -from other members, but about the same suspected member -are processed. In this way, the timeout will fall to its minimum level as long as the local member is receiving and processing gossip messages in a timely manner. Conversely, the suspicion timeout will remain high for members that are not receiving and processing gossip messages in a timely manner.
The timeout for a given suspicion is calculated as follows:
where:
• Min and Max are the minimum and maximum Suspicion timeout. See Section 4.3 for discussion of their configuration.
• K is the number of independent suspicions required to be received before setting the suspicion timeout to Min. In the memberlist implementation, K defaults to 3.
• C is the number of independent suspicions about that member received since the local suspicion was raised.
The timeout is recalculated whenever a suspect message is received that represents a previously unseen independent suspicion about the same member. At that time, the current suspicion timer is canceled and replaced with one for the remaining time until the new reduced timeout. If that amount of time has already passed, the timeout is triggered.
Logarithmic decay is used so that each successive reduction in the timeout is smaller than the last, as more independent suspect messages are received. The intuition behind this is that the first independent message gives the biggest increase in confidence that messages are being received in a timely manner, with each subsequent message adding less to the confidence.
To make independent suspicions more prevalent, when Dogpile is enabled the first K independent suspicions received about the same member are re-gossiped. Each suspicion is sent λ log(n) times, so that if K more suspicions are received, the maximum number of messages sent is (K + 1)λ log(n). Without Dogpile, the independent suspicions are not re-gossiped, and only the member's own suspicion is gossiped, a maximum of λ log(n) times.
Buddy System
In SWIM, a suspected member is not guaranteed to hear of the suspicion at the first opportunity. A suspected node only learns of the suspicion when it receives a gossiped suspect message about itself. While gossip messages are piggybacked on fault detector messages, including ping messages, the rules governing the dissemination of gossip messages include a limited number of gossip messages per piggyback, limited re-sends of each gossip message, and a preference for newer gossip messages.
Buddy System guarantees that any node that pings a suspected node (either on its own behalf, or for the indirect path of another node) will communicate the suspicion as part of the ping. This can result in refutation starting sooner, and also makes receipt of a suspicion by the suspected member a more timely signal for that member's Self-Awareness.
Evaluation
Evaluation Criteria
We evaluate Lifeguard according to the same criteria used to evaluate SWIM in the original paper (Section 5 of [1] ). Namely:
• Failure Detection False Positives. Lifeguard sets out to reduce the number of healthy members that are mistakenly marked as failed.
• Detection and Dissemination Latency. Lifeguard should not increase the time to first detection or full dissemination of true positive fault detection.
• Message Load. We consider the number of messages and bytes sent. Lifeguard should either decrease these, or not increase them by very much.
Lifeguard Component Combinations
The three components of Lifeguard described in Section 3 are evaluated separately and in combination, in order to understand their relative contribution, and the way they interact with one another. Experiments are run with the combinations of components described in Table 1 . Combination 'L0' gives the performance with Lifeguard completely disabled. It is the baseline against which the other combinations are compared. This approach is made possible by running a modified version of Consul, where each component can be enabled or disabled independently.
Combination Description
L0
All Lifeguard components disabled L1
Self-Awareness only L2
Dogpile only L3
Buddy System only L123
All Lifeguard components enabled 
Suspicion Timeout Configuration
As described in Section 3.2, Lifeguard's Dogpile component makes use of a Min and Max Suspicion timeout. In the memberlist implementation, these are configured as follows:
• n is the number of members in the known group.
• ProbeInterval is the interval between successive failure detector probe messages. The default value of 1 second is used for all experiments.
• α and β are tunable parameters.
To examine the effect of the tunable parameters, each experiment is repeated nine times, with Lifeguard (L123) configured with a different combination of α = 2, 4, 5 and β = 2, 4, 6. The performance of the different combinations is compared with the baseline performance of memberlist without Lifeguard enabled (L0), which has a fixed Suspicion timeout, equivalent to configuring α = 5 and β = 1.
Experiments
The SWIM paper correctly identifies that slow message processing may be due to a number of factors, including CPU exhaustion, network delay, and packet loss -either at the local host or in the network. The net result is always failure to process one or more protocol messages in a timely manner. For the purpose of this investigation, we induce slow message processing by pausing the sending and receiving of protocol messages at selected group members for well defined periods of time. We call each period of delay at one member an anomaly.
Two different types of experiment are used to evaluate the criteria defined in section 4.1: Threshold and Interval. They are described in the subsections that follow. The reason for two types of experiments is as follows:
• The Threshold experiment introduces a single set of concurrent anomalies per experiment. This allows the latency from the start of an anomaly to its detection and dissemination to be examined, as with only a single set of anomalies, the causality is clear.
• However, in real-world situations, CPU and network delays can be intermittent, with processes making progress in small bursts. The Interval experiment explores this space by introducing anomalies in a cyclic way for the duration of each experiment. The duration of and interval between anomalies is varied across a number of different experiments.
The experiments are performed using deployments of Consul, a service discovery and monitoring system built on top of memberlist. However, none of the higherlevel features of Consul (such as a Raft[4]-based consistent view of the available services) are employed, and the cluster is deployed without server instances, so that only the features of memberlist are exercised.
Threshold Experiment
The Threshold experiment is used to examine the effect of Lifeguard on detection and dissemination latency. It has the following form:
• 128 Consul agents are started in a single Linux VM, communicating over the loopback network interface.
• 15 seconds are allowed for the agents to quiesce.
• C instances (selected at random) enter an anomalous state, where they block immediately before sending or after receiving any protocol message from another member of the cluster. 6 • The anomalies continue for a duration D, at the end of which the blocked sends and receives are unblocked.
• The experiment continues until all 128 Consul instances return to seeing one another as healthy, or until 120 seconds have passed from the start of the experiment.
Many instances of the Threshold experiment are run for each combination of Lifeguard components, sweeping a range of values for C and D. The values tested are given in Table 2 . The experiment is run 10 times for each combination of Lifeguard components and other experiment parameters.
Interval Experiment
The Interval experiment is used to examine the effect of Lifeguard on both false positive failure detection, and message load. It has the same form as the Threshold experiment, apart from the following differences:
• At the end of the anomalous period of duration D, each of the anomalous Consul instances returns to normal operation for an interval I.
• The cycle of anomalous and normal operation repeats in rotation, for periods of length D and I respectively, until at least 120 seconds have passed since the beginning of the test. The test ends at the end of the next anomalous period.
Many instances of the Interval experiment are run for each combination of Lifeguard components, sweeping a range of values for C, D and I. The values tested are given in Table 3 . The experiment is run 10 times for each combination of Lifeguard components and other experiment parameters.
Experiment Environment
The experiments are run on Microsoft Azure Compute-Optimized (F-Series) VMs, which are deployed on 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2673 v3 (Haswell) processors. F16 instances are used, which are each allocated 16 cores and 32GiB of RAM. Ubuntu 16.04 LTS daily build 201701280 is used, and Consul is configured to write DEBUG-level logs to /dev/shm, the ramdisk that Ubuntu configures by default. Logs are copied to SSD at the end of each experiment.
To reduce scheduling and memory access indeterminacy, 8 Consul agents are pinned to each of the 16 CPU cores and the associated memory bank, using the Linux numactl tool. CPU usage is monitored throughout the lifetime of each experiment, by sampling /proc/stat [10] at a 1 second interval, and it is confirmed that there is spare CPU capacity in all experiments, indicated by a increase in the aggregate core idle time at each interval. In practice, 16 cores on this class of CPU is excessive for 128 Consul agents.
Results
The experiments explore a large combinatorial space of parameter values. To make the results more tractable, we first examine the performance of Lifeguard with the tunable Suspicion timeout parameters (described in Section 4.3), set to the highest values considered: α = 5 and β = 6. We then examine the effect of lowering α and β .
Failure Detection False Positives
The Interval experiment, described in Section 4.4.2, is used to measure the effect of Lifeguard on the occurrence of failure detection false positives -that is, of healthy agents mistakenly being marked as failed. We define a failure detection false positive as occurring each time an agent failure event is raised by a Consul agent, and the event is about a Consul agent that is not in the set of agents for which anomalies have been introduced. Within these false positives, we distinguish between false positives that occur at any Consul agent (denoted FP), and those that occur at healthy agents (denoted FP-). FPare most concerning, as in this case, both of the agents involved -the one raising the event and the one that the event is about -are in fact healthy. Table 4 gives the aggregated false positive statistics for all Interval experiments where α = 5 and β = 6. The meaning of each column is as follows:
• Lifeguard Components : Combination of Lifeguard components enabled, as described in Section 4.2.
• FP Events : Total number of false positive failure events occurring at all Consul agents.
• FP-Events : Number of false positive failure events occurring at healthy agents (outside of the set that have anomalies introduced).
• FP % L0 : FP Events as a percentage of the value for L0 (the baseline).
• FP-% L0 : FP-Events as a percentage of the value for L0 (the baseline). Table 4 shows that false positives are dominated by those occurring at slow processing members. This is indicated by FP-being a small proportion of FP, for all combinations of Lifeguard components, including the baseline with Lifeguard completely disabled (L0). Table 4 : Aggregated false positive results for all experiments where α = 5 and β = 6. For each combination of Lifeguard Components, FP Events is the total number of false positive events, and FP-Events is the number of false positive events at healthy nodes. FP % L0 and FP-% L0 give the same results as the percentage of their respective values for L0. Table 4 also shows that the false positive rate is drastically reduced by the introduction of Lifeguard. All components of Lifeguard contribute to the reduction, with Dogpile (L2) making the biggest individual contribution. Combining all of the components (L123) has the greatest effect. Both the overall number of false positives (FP Events) and false positives at healthy nodes (FP-Events) are reduced to less than 2% of their levels without Lifeguard. This represents a more than 50x reduction in false positives.
Parameter Label Values Tested
The effect of the Buddy System component (L3) is noteworthy, since it more than halves the false positives at healthy members (FP-), but has relatively little effect on the overall number of false positives (FP). This difference is explained by considering the method of action of Buddy System, which works to make a suspected member aware of the suspicion in a more timely manner. This in turn can lead to refutation starting sooner. Healthy members (responsible for FP-) can receive and process the refutation in a timely manner, where as members experiencing slow message processing often can not. Since FP is in general dominated by false positives members experiencing slow message processing, this leaves it little changed by Buddy System.
The results in Table 4 aggregate the false positive event counts for all tested numbers of concurrent anomalies (C, as defined in Section 4.4.1). Figures 1 and 2 consider the variation in number of false positives with the number of concurrent anomalies. Figure 1 shows the total number of false positives (FP Events) for each number of concurrent anomalies tested. It shows clearly that the number of false positives rises with the number of concurrent anomalies, but that at every concurrency level, Lifeguard (L123) reduces the number of false positives by a factor of between 50x and 100x. Figure 2 shows the number of false positives at healthy members (FP-Events) for each number of concurrent anomalies tested. It is more noisy, compared to Figure 1 , due to these events being much less frequent than false positives in general. Once again, the number of false positives rises with the number of concurrent anomalies, and at every concurrency level, Lifeguard (L123) reduces the number of false positives at healthy members by a factor of between 10x and 100x. The false positive rate is reduced so much with Lifeguard fully enabled that at some concurrencies, zero false positives occurred at healthy nodes during repeated testing.
Detection and Dissemination Latency
The Threshold experiment, described in Section 4.4.1, is used to measure the effect of Lifeguard on detection and dissemination latency for true positive failures. Table 5 shows the effect of the different Lifeguard components on detection and dissemination latencies across all experiments where α = 5 and β = 6. The meaning of each column is as follows:
• Lifeguard Components : Combination of Lifeguard components enabled, defined in Section 4.2. Table 5 : First detection and full dissemination latencies for all experiments where α = 5 and β = 6. All times are in seconds.
• Median 1st Detect : The median time from the start of an anomaly to its first detection by one other agent.
• 99th % 1st Detect : The 99th percentile time from the start of an anomaly to its first detection by one other agent.
• 99.9th % 1st Detect : The 99.9th percentile time from the start of an anomaly to its first detection by one other agent.
• Median Full Dissem : The median time from the start of an anomaly to dissemination of the failure to all healthy agents.
• 99th % Full Dissem : The 99th percentile time from the start of an anomaly to dissemination of the failure to all healthy agents.
• 99.9th % Full Dissem : The 99.9th percentile time from the start of an anomaly to dissemination of the failure to all healthy agents. Table 5 shows that Lifeguard (L123) raises the latencies for first detection and full dissemination by a small amount. The median increases 0.1 seconds (less than 0.1%) for both first detection and full dissemination. The increases in 99th and 99.9th percentile latencies are larger, at around 1 second (6-7%) for first de-tection and 1.5-1.8 seconds (7-9%) for 99.9th percentile. Self-Awareness (L1) appears to make the largest contribution to the increase in 99th percentile latencies, while Dogpile (L2) makes the largest contribution to the increases in 99.9th percentile latencies.
Message Load
The Interval experiment, described in Section 4.4.2, is used to measure the effect of Lifeguard on message load. The number of messages and total bytes sent in each experiment are captured using Consul's telemetry [11] . Table 6 gives the aggregated message load statistics for all experiments where α = 5 and β = 6. The meaning of each column is as follows:
• • Msgs % L0 : Msgs Sent as a percentage of the value for L0 (the baseline).
• Bytes % L0 : Bytes Sent as a percentage of the value for L0 (the baseline). Table 6 shows that for experiments with α = 5 and β = 6, Lifeguard leads to an average increase of around 11% in the number of messages sent, but the amount of data sent actually decreases by around 2%. Dogpile (L2) is the main contributor to the increase in both the number of messages and bytes sent. However, this effect is offset by Self-Awareness (L1), which reduces both the number of messages and bytes sent.
Suspicion Timeout Tuning
The results in the previous sections were obtained with the tunable Suspicion timeout parameters set to α = 5 and β = 6, which are the highest values considered. We now examine the effect of lowering α and β . Table 7 shows the values for the metrics defined in Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2, for Lifeguard (L123) when configured with different combinations of α and β . The metrics are shown as a percentage of their baseline values from running the same set of experiments without Lifeguard (L0).
The following relationships are observed:
• All six latency measures (Med First, Med Full, 99% First, 99% Full, 99.9% First and 99.9% Full) are positively correlated with α. • When α = 2, the latency measures (and in particular the 99%, and 99.9% measures) are also positively correlated with β . The same correlation is not obvious at higher values of α.
• Total false positives (FP) and false positives at healthy members (FP-) are negatively correlated with α and β .
As a result, α and β may be used to tune the detection and dissemination latencies, at the same time as the false positive rate. Because lower values of α and β improve latency while making the false positive rate worse, a reduction in detection latency must be traded for a higher false positive rate.
However, even in the case of the most extreme tradeoff (α = 2 and β = 2), where median detection and dissemination latency are reduced by around 45% compared to L0, the false positive rate at healthy nodes FP-is still reduced by 68% (a 3x reduction) compared to the L0 value. At the other extreme (α = 5 and β = 6), median latencies remain at their L0 levels, but false positives are reduced by over 98% (more than 50x), with modest increases in 99th and 99.9th percentile latencies.
Selecting values for α and β in between these extremes allows the trade-off between reduced latency and false positives to be tuned, albeit in a coarsegrained manner. We expose α and β as parameters of memberlist. We also introduce a new cluster health metric, member.flap, into Consul and Serf [12] , that increments if an agent is marked dead and recovers within a short time period. This metric can help users make an informed decision when tuning these parameters.
Conclusions and Future Work
Our goal with Lifeguard was to reduce the rate of false positive failures experienced by a SWIM-based group membership protocol, while minimally impacting latencies and message load. Across a wide range of cases tested, the Lifeguard extensions achieve this, with reductions in false positives in the range of 10x to 100x, and over 50x on average. The false positive rate is reduced so much that at some levels of concurrent anomalies, zero false positives occurred at healthy nodes during repeated testing. This is achieved with negligible increase in median detection and dissemination latencies, and modest (6-9%) increase in 99 and 99.9th percentile latencies. On average, around 12% more messages are sent, but the total bytes sent actually falls around 2%. Additionally, through tuning of the Suspicion timeouts used by Lifeguard's Dogpile component, some of the reduction in false positives can be traded for a reduction in latencies. But even in the case of the most extreme tradeoff tested, where median detection and dissemination latency are reduced by 45% (close to 2x), the false positive rate at healthy nodes is still reduced by 68% (3x), compared with Lifeguard disabled.
All measures of detection and dissemination latency are reduced by the tuning, however the gap between median and 99th percentile latencies widens as the median latency is decreased. This is not surprising, given that SWIM's selection of peers to communicate with is randomized and has no coordination between members. Future work will explore ways to more tightly bound detection and dissemination latencies, starting with extending the use of round-robin peer selection, which SWIM currently uses only for failure detection, to be used for dissemination as well.
Lifeguard has several other parameters, which currently use heuristically determined values. These include Dogpile's re-gossip factor (K), the saturation limit of the NSA counter (S) and the scores given to the different events that affect the NSA counter. Future work will explore the configuration of these parameters, including looking for metrics that could allow them to be automatically tuned via feedback.
Finally, the problems encountered in making slow message processing fit into a crash-stop model indicate the need to investigate more nuanced, perhaps probabilistic, models of service availability.
